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Abstract—Fault injection through partial dynamic reconfigu-
ration can simulate upsets in configuration memory of SRAM-
based FPGAs. FT-UNSHADES 2 is an automated set-up, which
runs multiple fault injection campaigns in batch mode, while
automatically applying stimuli and comparing output vectors.
This work presents the results of fault injection runs of an
FPGA design intended for the data processing unit (DPU) of
the Solar Orbiter Polarimetric and Helioseismic Imager (SoPHI)
instrument on solar orbiter. In this DPU SRAM FPGAs are
connected to a processor through a radiation hardened antifuse
FPGA. This antifuse FPGA houses the configuration and data
interfaces to the SRAM FPGAs of the DPU. When radiation
induced errors occur in the SRAM FPGA, the antifuse FPGA
isolates these errors and recovers operation. The fault injection
campaign gave insight on fault induced behavior on the interfaces
of the SRAM FPGA, allowed to categorize them, and create
statistics of the different categories. This paper describes the
mechanisms of fault detection isolation and recovery in the
SRAM/antifuse FPGA interfaces and tests them with the faulty
output vectors from fault injection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Scientific space probes and satellites consist of an space
craft platform and various science instruments. The science
instruments acquire measurement data and the space craft
carries them to their orbit and performs communication with
an earth station. Complex instruments require their own data
processing unit (DPU) to control them. Those control tasks
do not require a lot of processing power. Modern sensors are
able to acquire large amounts of data, but the down link rate
has not increased at the same rate, as it requires expensive
ground stations. Therefore the Solar Orbiter Polarimetric and
Helioseismic Imager (SoPHI) instrument is equipped with a
more powerful DPU to compute and compress acquired data.
In the SoPHI instrument, it is not the acquired image which is
of scientific interest, but maps of magnetic field properties, that
can be computed from acquired images. By not transmitting
acquired images, but magnetic field parameters, the instrument
can reduce data rate even more than by simple compression.
In order to be able to process these large amounts of data,
the DPU requires more processing power than space qualified
processors can offer. SRAM FPGAs are available in space
qualified packages and can be programmed to perform data
processing tasks faster than space grade processors. However,
SRAM FPGAs are only radiation tolerant and do experience
operational interrupts like SEUs for single memory cells or
SEFIs for the entire device. Therefore the architecture of the
DPU needs to be able to deal with this kind of events.
To test the design for operational interrupts caused by ion-
izing particle radiation on ground would require an expensive
particle accelerator. Instead, susceptibility data from radiation
tests by the manufacturer is combined with radiation data of
the orbit to estimate upset rates. Upsets that alter the value of
a memory cell in an SRAM FPGA can be grouped into three
categories: Single event functional interrupts (SEFIs), upsets
in user registers that change the value stored in a register of
the design, and upsets that alter the value in the configuration
memory. As the number of bits in configuration memory is the
largest of these three categories, these upsets have the largest
cross section. Errors in the configuration memory do alter the
way the FPGA operates and thus the logic function it performs.
Fault injection is the process of simulating such an upset by
altering the value of such a memory cell [1]. Therefore the
combination of radiation testing of the device, radiation data of
the orbit, and fault injection allows to investigate and estimate
the behavior of a system with an SRAM FPGA in orbit [2].
This paper presents such an estimation for the DPU of the
SoPHI instrument.
II. FAULT INJECTION WITH FT-UNSHADES 2
FT-UNSHADES 2 [3] [4] is an automated FPGA-based fault
injection platform. It consists of an FPGA motherboard and
two custom daughterboards, see Fig. 2. A server running a user
friendly web interface connects via USB 2.0 to the mother-
board. The motherboard stores stimuli and configuration data
and compares responses. It also connects to the daughterboards
via PCI-Express. Each daughterboard features a service FPGA
and a test FPGA. The service FPGA configures the test
FPGA via SelectMap, applies input stimuli, and records output
responses from the test FPGA. The design under test (DUT)
can therefore fully occupy the test FPGA. FT-UNSHADES
2 can inject errors to user registers in the design or the
configuration memory. User registers correspond to register
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Fig. 1: Block diagram of the SoPHI DPU, with SRAM-based FPGAs (Xilinx Virtex-4 SX55), antifuse FPGA (RTAX), and
processor (LEON3-FT).
values described in the VHDL design, they are therefore also
present if the design is intended to be implemented in an ASIC.
Therefore the user register mode can also be used to test ASIC
designs. Injection into configuration registers only applies to
SRAM FPGAs, so this mode is for testing the effects of upsets
in configuration data. All FPGAs in the FT-UNSHADES 2
system are Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGAs. The test FPGA used in
the test described in this paper is a Xilinx Virtex-5 FX70T.
The custom daughterboards of FT-UNSHADES 2 can also be
equipped with the LX50T variant.
Fig. 2: Schematic of the FT-UNSHADES 2 setup; consisting
of control FPGA, two custom FPGA cards containing a service
FPGA and a test FPGA; each test FPGA hosts the design under
test (DUT); via USB 2.0 this hardware connects to a host PC.
III. SOPHI INSTRUMENT ON SOLAR ORBITER
Solar Orbiter is a mission of ESA’s Cosmic Vision 2015-
2025 Program. It is currently in completion and its launch is
scheduled for 2018. It will travel to close proximity of the sun
and its observations are designed to improve understanding of
solar and heliospheric physics [5].
The SoPHI instrument will acquire full solar disk and high
resolution images at different polarizations and wavelengths.
From this image data the DPU of solar orbiter will compute
maps of the photospheric vector magnetic field, line of sight
velocity, and continuum intensity in the visible wavelength
range [6].
IV. DATA PROCESSING UNIT OF SOPHI
To meet all these processing requirements, the DPU of the
SoPHI instrument features a GR712RC LEON3FT processor,
a Microsemi RTAX FPGA, and two Xilinx Virtex-4 FPGAs
[7]. Fig. 1 shows a simplified diagram of the interconnections
between these integrated circuits. The GR712RC LEON3FT
processor runs the instrument software. By attaching an RTAX
FPGA to the IO-area of the processor’s memory bus, software
can read and write registers in that FPGA. The RTAX FPGA
in turn connects to two Xilinx Virtex-4 FPGAs. These FPGAs
are referred to as Reconfigurable FPGAs (RFPGAs) in this
system.
Image data from the detector arrives at the Virtex-4 FPGAs.
In default operation one Virtex-4 FPGA receives and buffers
data and the other FPGA runs an image stabilization algorithm.
In case the FPGA dedicated for image acquisition fails, the
other FPGA can resume this task. However, this FPGA has no
buffer memory resolution and therefore data rate would have
to be reduced. The Virtex-4 FPGAs can be powered down,
while the processor remains operational.
Fig. 3 is a diagram of design blocks in the antifuse FPGA.
There is a data and configuration interface to each of the
Virtex-4 FPGAs. For configuration the RTAX FPGA features
































Fig. 3: Block diagram of the central control FPGA in SoPHI
DPU.
each Virtex-4 FPGA. Due to lack of pins and to protect from
errors resulting from upsets in the Virtex-4 FPGAs there is
an interface block for data communication which performs
serialization. In the following this block will be referred to
as InterFPGA interface. The two InterFPGA interfaces attach
to a wormhole routing switch. Wormhole routing implies that
the switch consumes the first data word and passes it on to
the connection indicated in that data word. The switch in turn
connects to a flash memory controller for direct storage of
acquired data and an IO-Bus bridge, to the memory bus of the
processor. Via this bridge software running on the processor
can send and receive data packets to and from the switch.
The switch and attached nodes form a Network-on-Chip. This
Network-on-Chip extends into the Virtex-4 FPGAs where it
may feature another switch or directly terminate with a node.
Fig. 4: SocWire protocol (SoCP) network node consisting of
protocol handler, its registers, and the processing core.
Each node in the Network-on-Chip features a protocol han-
dler, see Fig. 4. The protocol is derived from the ESA standard
remote memory access protocol (RMAP), it is referred to
as SocWire protocol (SoCP) [8]. It is adapted for on chip
use and simplified, so that a hardware handler fits in every
node. Each protocol handler has read and write registers to
set parameters. The protocol handler processes the addressing
header of packets and can pass bare process data to processing
nodes. There are two types of packets, which the handler
passes to the processing core. For processing packets the
handler sends the reply of the processing core to the processor
and for stream packets the reply is passed to another node.
The address of the node to which data is passed can be set
by registers in the protocol handler. In every switch in this
Network-on-Chip the path to the microprocessor must always
be on port number zero, thus the address of the processor is
always known and does not need to be stored.
A. Design under Test (DUT)
The LEON3FT processor and antifuse FPGA feature triple
modular redundancy in their registers and do not have a
configuration memory that can be upset by ionizing particle
radiation. However the two RFPGAs (Xilinx Virtex-4 FPGAs)
are susceptible to upsets. To evaluate the effects of radiation
upsets with fault injection the test design depicted in Fig. 5
was prepared. Inside the RFPGA is one side of a serialization
interface (interFPGA if ), an SoCP protocol handler, and a
finite state machine (FSM) with an attached internal memory
block. This state machine is a simple example of a processing
core. It allows to read and write the content of data packets
to the memory block.
In simulation there is also the interFPGA if that would
normally be contained in the antifuse FPGA. It serializes
packets sent to the DUT and deserializes the responses. This
simplifies debugging and allows to attach a simple file reader
to simulate the request that would normally be sent by the
processor. The file used for simulation contains the following
packets.
1) Writing zeros and ones to all registers.
2) Setting the handler register that is used as write address
for the Block RAM.
3) A process packet to write 2 data words to Block RAM.
4) A stream packet to write 64 data words to Block RAM.
5) Writing to the register that holds the read address.
6) Register write to trigger reading and define read length.
7) Reading from read registers.
8) Testing with incomplete packages and parity errors.
The stimuli vectors were recorded from the waveforms
of the simulation. Subsequently, FT-UNSHADES’ service
FPGAs played those stimuli vectors during fault injection.
B. Completeness of the test vectors
The test input vectors recorded from waveform simulations
with the test bench are as good as the test bench. We used
the code coverage metrics branch, expression, condition, and
toggle coverage to ensure test set completeness. The ability
of the input test vectors to allow an error caused by upsets to
propagate to the outputs is beyond the scope of this paper, but















Fig. 5: Sketch of the tested design, with Inter FPGA interface,
SoCP Protocol handler, FSM finite state machine, and Block
RAM memory.
C. Upset rates estimated for the SOPHI instrument on Solar
Orbiter
An important challenge when designing systems with inte-
grated electronics for space applications are single event upsets
[9]. The ionizing particle radiation that causes these upsets
has been studied [10] and there is radiation data available
for earth orbits. Solar Orbiter will operate on an elliptic orbit
around the sun with a perihelion down to 0.28 AU [11]. The
environment specification of solar orbiter recommends the use
of radiation data from a geostationary orbit and scaling of the
radiation components originating from the sun to account for
closer proximity. This is computed by simply dividing the the
surface of the sphere at the distance of the earth rE = 1AU
by the surface of the sphere at the distance of the spacecraft










For the estimation of upset rates 5 typical scenarios are used.
Two of these scenarios do not need to be scaled as they are
outside solar particle events.
1) Solar Maximum: The solar wind is at a maximum, so
galactic cosmic rays are at a minimum.
2) Solar Minimum: The solar wind is at its minimum, so
galactic cosmic rays are at their maximum.
The remaining scenarios need to be scaled, as in these cases
radiation originates from the sun.
1) Solar Flare Worst Week: Average flux for the worst week
of a solar particle event.
2) Solar Flare Worst Day: Average flux of the worst day
of a solar particle event.
3) Solar Flare Worst 5 Minutes: Average flux of the worst
5 minutes of a solar particle event.
Radiation data was obtained from CREME [12], with the
setting of 1g/cm2 of aluminum shielding. That radiation
data was downloaded, modified with the scaling factor and
uploaded again. [13] discusses this in detail.
Susceptibility data for individual elements of Xilinx Virtex-
4 FPGAs is available from radiation testing, [14] and [15].
In CREME96 this data was combined with the radiation
environment scaled for the orbit of solar orbiter, see [13] again
for details. Table I and II present the expected error rates for
the Virtex-4 FPGAs on the SoPHI DPU. The selected error
categories are defined and explained in detail in [15].
TABLE I: Estimation of heavy ion induced SEUs and SEFIs
per day and individual element.
SEUs per individual element
Config. Cell BRAM User FFs1(1) User FFs1(0)
solar min 2.5e-7 7.1e-7 1.0e-6 3.9e-7
solar max 8.4e-8 2.6e-7 3.6e-7 1.2e-7
worst week 1.4e-3 9.6e-3 8.7e-3 7.9e-4
worst day 6.6e-3 4.8e-2 4.2e-2 3.6e-3
worst 5 min. 2.5e-2 1.7e-1 1.6e-1 1.3e-2
SEFIs2per device (entire RFPGA)
POR SEFI3 SMAP SEFI4 GSIG5
solar min 1.2e-5 9.6e-6 3.9e-6
solar max 4.0e-6 3.3e-6 1.4e-6
worst week 0.26 0.2 0.095
worst day 1.3 1.1 0.47
worst 5 min. 4.7 4.3 1.8
1 Flip-Flop.
2 Single Event Functional Interrupt.
3 Power-On-Reset Single Event Functional Interrupt.
4 SelectMap Single Event Functional Interrupt.
5 Global Signal Single Event Functional Interrupt.
TABLE II: Estimation of proton induced SEUs and SEFIs per
day and individual element.
SEUs per individual element
Config. Cell BRAM User FFs (1) User FFs (0)
solar min 1.6e-8 1.7e-8 5.8e-8 1.7e-8
solar max 6.0e-9 6.1e-9 2.0e-8 6.1e-9
worst week 1.5e-4 2.6e-4 8.2e-4 2.3e-4
worst day 5.8e-4 1.0e-3 3.3e-3 9.2e-4
worst 5min 2.1e-3 3.8e-3 1.2e-2 3.3e-3
SEFIs per device (entire RFPGA)
POR SEFI SMAP SEFI GSIG
solar min 8.3e-07 6.5e-7 8.1e-7
solar max 3.0e-7 2.3e-7 3.0e-7
worst week 8.6e-3 9.9e-3 7.7e-3
worst day 3.4e-2 4.0e-2 3.0e-2
worst 5 min 1.2e-1 1.5e-1 1.1e-1
V. COMPARISON OF VIRTEX-4 AND VIRTEX-5 FPGAS
The SoPHI DPU uses two Xilinx Virtex-4 XQR4VSX55
FPGAs, but the FT-UNSHADES 2 boards are equipped with
Xilinx Virtex-5 XC5VFX70T FPGAs. Firstly, data from radi-
ation testing is available for all space grade devices, including
the XQR4VSX55 FPGAs. Estimation of upset rates was there
performed solely with Virtex-4 data, so physical size of
elements and chip manufacturing is correctly accounted for.
Fault injection is only used to investigate design behavior
when configuration bits change their value. Thus, there is no
difference in using commercial devices instead of flight parts
for fault injection.
Virtex-5 devices are the direct successor to Virtex-4 devices.
In both devices a configurable logic block (CLB) forms
the smallest addressable block for implementation of logic
functions. In a Virtex-4 such a CLB contains 4 slices and
in a Virtex-5 a CLB contains 2 slices, but each Virtex-4
slice has only two 4-input look-up tables whereas a Virtex-5
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slice has four 6-input look-up tables. In conclusion a Virtex-5
CLB can implement more complex logic functions in a single
CLB. The synthesis tool takes the look-up table structure into
consideration. Xilinx ISE allows to use a netlist synthesized
for Virtex-4 on a Virtex-5 device. Table III lists slice usage
for the interface test design used for fault injection.
TABLE III: LUT usage of Virtex-4 and Virtex-5 designs.
Design Device # of slice % of sliceLUTs LUTs
IF test Virtex-5 763 1%
IF test Virtex-4 1076 2%
IF test Virtex-5 914 2%(synthesis Virtex-4)
The number of LUTs used in a Virtex-4 design and a design
synthesized for Virtex-4, but implemented on Virtex-5, are
similar and differ significantly from a design synthesized and
implemented on a Virtex-5. The similarity of the structures and
these numbers indicate that it is viable to make estimations
from usage of a Virtex-5 device in fault injection instead of a
Virtex-4 device.
VI. ERRONEOUS OUTPUTS PER INJECTED FAULT
The first objective of the fault injection campaign is to
establish how many of the 22,702,848 configuration bits in a
Virtex XQR4VSX55 actually lead to a detectable error when
altered through an upset. Even with the ability to inject many
faults quickly of FT-UNSHADES 2 it is not possible to inject
in every configuration bit at every possible clock cycle of the
input stimuli. For Virtex-5 implementation the Xilinx Impact
tool delivers a set of essential bits. The fault injection results
listed in Table IV are obtained by 10,000 injections to those
essential bits.
TABLE IV: Number of injections and recorded errors in the
output vectors.
Design Synthesis errors injections % essential bits
IF test BRAM Virtex 5 5453 10000 55 163783
IF test BRAM Virtex 4 5376 10000 54 178789
IF test dRAM Virtex 5 5362 10000 54 331501
IF test dRAM Virtex 4 5497 10000 55 1216979
Each injection was equivalent to flipping one random con-
figuration bit at a random clock cycle and running it for all
clock cycles of the input vectors. Errors were counted if there
were one or more errors in the output vectors of a run. In
all four tests listed in Table IV about 54% of the essential
bits showed detectable errors at the outputs. As the Virtex-4
synthesis which uses Block RAMs is the closest to the design
that will be used in the DPU, this results in an estimation of
54% of the 178, 789 essential bits actually resulting in errors,
when flipped. So the number of actually sensitive bits is about
100, 000 for this design.
The effective error rates listed in Table V show that the
design has few errors under normal condition (solar min and
max). Solar Orbiter’s orbit is very elliptical, so it is unlikely
that flare conditions at closest approach coincide. However
TABLE V: Estimation of errors resulting from SEUs in
configuration memory per day, assuming 100, 000 actually
sensitive bits and susceptibility per individual element as given
by Table II.
conditions errors errors






if a design shall function in these conditions, it needs to be
protected by triple modular redundancy.
VII. FAULT CLASSIFICATION
FT-UNSHADES does not only detect errors in outputs, it
does also record XOR vectors of the output of the golden
DUT and the injected DUT along with the clock cycles at
which the differences occurred. A script can reconstruct the
faulty outputs as given by the DUT.
A. Characterization by affected outputs
The most obvious way to characterize errors in outputs
due to fault injection is to categorize them by the output bits
affected. A matlab script processed the 10,000 fault injection
runs for all four design variants. Table VI lists the results from
processing these fault injections runs. The injection runs have
been categorized in five categories:
1) In the InterFPGA interface there is a READY signal that
indicates that the receiver is able to process more data.
If it is low, this signal stalls the transmitter in the other
FPGA. The READY signal output of the Virtex-4 FPGA
is an input to the antifuse FPGA. Runs that only resulted
in errors in this READY make up this first category.
2) This category contains all injection runs with errors
in signals of the InterFPGA interface other than the
READY signal. Therefore this category reflects injec-
tions that lead to errors in the data packets.
3) As shown in Fig. 5 the protocol handler has registers
directly connected to outputs. In the DPU these signals
are used to as non-essential external control lines. This
category includes injections, which only resulted in
errors in these control lines.
4) This category contains injection runs that have error
in the READY signal as well as other signals of the
InterFPGA interface.
5) The final category contains all other cases, i.e. there are
error in the register values and the InterFPGA interface
outputs.
6) No error.
The percentages for the different categories are about iden-
tical. Slight variations for the different designs are no surprise,
because the 10,000 injection locations for each design were
randomly selected. With about 30% the majority of injection
results fall into the first category. So they only stall the
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TABLE VI: Number of injection runs that resulted in errors
of the categories defined above.
Design Category1 2 3 4 5 6
V5 BRAM 2966 427 15 2009 36 4547
V5 dRAM 3009 334 15 1966 38 4638
V4 BRAM 3011 339 22 1964 40 4624
V4 dRAM 2962 471 12 2012 40 4503
reception of further data packets from the antifuse FPGA. This
error condition is easily detectable by a timeout in the antifuse
FPGA. The second category with errors in the packet data only
accounts for 3% to 5% of the injection runs. It is therefore
relatively rare. Category number 4 with errors in the READY
signal as well as the other outputs of the InterFPGA interface,
is more common with about 20%. Register outputs are only
affected in very few cases, as categories 3 and 5 are below
1%.
B. Characterization by feeding outputs back to simulation
To investigate injection results the outputs of the fault
injection campaign were fed back to the simulation test bench.
This was accomplished by replacing the UUT by a file
reader that reads the outputs recorded from the fault injection
campaign, see Fig. 6. The receiver part of the InterFPGA
interface performed deserialization and subsequent assertions
reported errors in the data packets.
Fig. 6: Simulation without unit under test to evalutate reactions
of interFPGA interface to fault injection outputs.
It is very straightforward to predict the reaction of the
receiver on a stuck READY signal. It will simply stall and
timeout. Therefore injection results of category 1 were not
fed back to the simulation. Table VII lists observations from
10 injection campaigns that had errors in the data packets only,
i.e. category 2.
The InterFPGA interface has 4 parallel data lines. The
Network-on-Chip in both FPGAs operates with 16 parallel
signals and thus 16 bit data words. The Receiver therefore
assembles 4 times 4 bits back to a single word. There is
an extra signal line on that interface that indicates control
characters. When this line is high the data lines indicate one
of three possible control character: 1) Null (there is no valid
data in this clock cycle), 2) End of Packet (the data packet
ends with this character), and 3) Erroneous End of Packet
(the data packet ends with this character and the packet is
marked, because an error occurred during its processing).
With the end of packet markers it is possible to detect if the
number of transmissions does not match up to 16 bit. The
receiver performs this and marks those packets with an error
labeled ‘unmatched’. All but one injection result showed this
error, which makes it simple to detect. Further observations
were errors in stream packet data, hardware identifier, protocol
instruction, and address.
TABLE VII: Observations in simulation with output data from
injections that resulted in errors in the SoCP packets only.
Number Unmatched Further observation
1 Yes Error in stream packet data
2 Yes None
3 Yes None
4 Yes Error in Hardware ID
5 No Error in SoCP instruction
6 Yes Error in SoCP instruction
7 Yes None
8 Yes None
9 Yes Error in SoCP instruction
10 Yes Error in address
Injection results that only had errors in the register outputs
were not investigated by these simulations, because the effect
and results are obviously only faulty values on those outputs.
Table VII lists the results from simulation of 5 cases with
errors in all interFPGA signals including the READY signal.
All of these cases led to a restart of the interFPGA are thus
easily detectable.
TABLE VIII: Observations in simulation with output data from
injections that resulted in errors in the SoCP packets and the
READY signal.
Number Unmatched Further observation
1 Yes link restart
2 No link restart
3 No link restart
4 No link restart
5 No link restart
Simulations with the last category, i.e. errors in the outputs
that belong to the interFPGA interface and the registers, also
resulted in easily detectable link restarts.
TABLE IX: Observations in simulation with output data from
injections that resulted in errors in different output signals.
Number Unmatched Further observation
1 No link restart
2 Yes link restart
3 Yes link restart; error in stream data
4 Yes link restart; error in stream data
5 Yes link restart; error in stream data
VIII. CONCLUSION
With FT-UNSHADES 2 the design is easily prepared for
fault injection. Input vectors are simply recorded from the
simulation test bench. FT-UNSHADES 2 automatically com-
pares output vectors to a golden copy. The webinterface is
easy to use and allows remote access. With this ease of
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design preparation and the ability to perform many injection
campaigns quickly in batch mode FT-UNSHADES 2 has made
this study possible.
The fault injection campaign showed that only about 54%
of flips in the essential bits lead to an observable misbehavior.
Fault injection also showed the ways the design behaves in
case of bit flips in configuration data. In about 55% of the
cases the FPGA refuses to accept further data, which is easily
detected by a timeout. Further measures like ensuring that the
number of bits in a word match and protection on the data
link were able to detect many cases of bit flips. There were
instances in which the errors were solely in the data packets.
So the usage and application needs to have the capability to
tolerate the occurrence of errors in the application data, but
the set-up ensures there is no case that results in a crashed
DPU.
With the Xilinx Zynq FPGAs in space qualified package
becoming available soon, an interesting aisle of further work
is to update the injection platform to these devices. As newer
FPGA generations use a standard AXI interface, it would be
interesting to investigate AXI interfaces in a similar fashion.
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